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COMMENTS
The Consent Decree In Antitrust
Enforcement--Analysis and Criticism
INTRODUCTION

This comment will, in a general manner, attempt to set forth
the position and importance of the consent decree in current antitrust enforcement procedures. No attempt will be made to discuss the
settlement procedure in the Federal Trade Commission proceedings.'
The definition and enforcement abilities of a consent decree, as set
forth by several important Supreme Court decisions, will be discussed. This topic will include the legal effectiveness of the decree
as an enforcement procedure, as a binding agreement upon the
parties involved, and as a judicial precedent. The reasons for the
use of the consent decree by the various parties thereto will be explained, setting forth the viewpoints of both the government attorneys
and private counsel. This comment will then conclude with a discussion of recent criticisms concerning the use of the consent decree
procedure and suggestions for more effective implementation of it in
the future.
I.

DEFINITION OF THE CONSENT DECREE AND ITS LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS

A. Nature of the consent decree.
A consent decree is, basically, a voluntary settlement of issues
concerning violation of the antitrust laws which are raised by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.2 This settlement
is incorporated into a document and approved in a routine manner
by a federal district court.3
The federal antitrust laws do not contain an express provision
1.

For a good discussion of recent developments in

this field, see Horsky,

Settlement, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 507 (1958).
It appears that the Federal
Trade Commission amended its Rules of Practice in 1954 and adopted a new
consent procedure which makes settlement much more attractive to a defendant.
Horsky lists the three major changes as follows: (1) the requirement that FTC
consent settlements contain findings of fact was eliminated, thereby decreasing
defendant's fear of treble damage possibilities; (2) consent orders are now permitted which dispose of only some of the issues, or which affect only some of tile
defendants; (3) settlement is now possible at any stage of the proceedings.
2. Hereinafter referred to as "the Government."
3. Although the trial court does have the discretion to reject or alter the
decree, in actual practice it never does so. The defendant has consented to the
decree, leaving no one to point out its defects to the court. Also, it is often a
settlement of very difficult economic questions, yet there are no findings of fact
or reasons behind the provisions set out in the decree. The trial judge therefore

has nothing to go on. See Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through
Consent Decrees, 53 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1940).

[367]
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for consent decrees. Instead, the legal effectiveness of consent decrees
is implied from several sources: 4 the power of the federal district
courts sitting as courts of equity to enter decrees in antitrust actions;5
the general authority delegated to officials charged with administration and enforcement of the antitrust laws; 6 and from the language
of Section 5 of the Clayton Act. 7

A consent decree is a hybrid procedural device. It is not treated
as a contract, although the terms are reached entirely by negotiation
between the parties,8 and it does not resemble a decree resulting
from litigation.9 It is actually a judicially enforceable negotiation of
economic questions between government and business.
The main advantage of a consent decree lies in its informality
and flexibility. The difficulties in pleading and proving questions
of economics by the usual legal process are eliminated. The atmosphere of the bargaining table is present, rather than the spirit of
advocacy before an open court. These characteristics tend to make
the consent decree a very useful device in the enforcement of the
somewhat nebulous antitrust laws. 10
4. This information is obtained from Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139
(1952).
5. The Government brings their actions under Section 4 of the Sherman
Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
This section reads in part as
follows:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of Sections 1-7 of this title; and
it shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys, in their
respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to
institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations....
The consent decree procedure emerges out of this process of litigation, as
settlement out of court is one of the oldest of legal usages. See HAMILTON & TILL,
ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-97 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940).
6. Timberg, Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judgments, 10
FED. B.J. 351 (1949).
7. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
This section specifically
exempts consent judgments or decrees from the statutory rule that final decrees
against defendants shall be prima facie evidence of violation in later suits against
them.
8. This is because of the judicial elements involved (court approval and
supervision) and the fact that a consent decree is subject to unilateral change,
which a contract is not.
9. There is no presentation of evidence, findings of fact, or conclusions of
law, as there is in a litigated decree. As a result, there is no real judicial scrutiny
in a consent decree. See Note, The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees,
63 HARv. L. REV. 320 (1949).
10. The advantages of a consent decree are ably set forth by HAMILTON &
TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-89 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940), as follows:
The consent decree permits a direct attack upon problems in industrial government. Questions do not have to be transmitted in the alien
language of the law; the proceedings ordained for ordinary courtroom
use do not obtrude with their distractions. The parties meet in informal
conference; no weight of intent and harm hangs heavy overhead; fact
and value do not have to trickle into the discussion through the conventional rules of evidence. An opportunity is presented to a group of
men, sitting around a table, to reach a settlement grounded in industrial
reality and the demands of public policy.
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B.

Legal Effectiveness of the Consent Decree.
1. Binding effect of the consent decree upon the parties
involved.
a. Upon the private party to the decree.
The private corporation which is considering settlement through
a consent decree may wish to know the extent to which they are
bound by this decree, and whether a change in conditions will allow
them to obtain a modification thereof. Five leading meat packers
supplied the answers to these questions in 1928 and 1932 when they
attempted to challenge first the validity of a consent decree (and
failed), and then attempted to get their decree modified (and
failed) .'1 The challenge made by the packers was very extensive;
as a result, the Supreme Court decisions which followed have established the legal effectiveness of the consent decree in a very comprehensive manner. As the following case history of the packers
will show, it is almost impossible to have a consent decree declared
12
void, and extremely difficult to obtain modification.
The original consent decree obtained against the packers was
very stringent. 13 Why they even consented to it is an interesting
question. The packers initially attacked the decree as void, alleging
first that the effect of the recital in the decree that no findings
of fact need be made, and that the decree should not be considered
as an admission or adjudication of guilt,14 was to conclude the
In addition, the instrument has a sweep which no process of law
could ever impart. It can go beyond sheer prohibition; it can attempt
to shape remedies to the requirements of industrial order. . . . It can
reach beyond the persons in legal combat to comprehend all the parties
to the industry. It can accord some protection to weaker groups and
safeguard to some extent the rights of the public. It can, unlike a decree
emerging from litigation, take into account the potential consequences
of its terms. It can make its attack upon the sources, rather than the
manifestations, of restraint; give consideration to activities that would
never be aired in open court; probe into matters which the prosecution
could never prove; explore conduct just outside of restraint; follow
wherever the trial leads. It can amend usage, create new trade practices,
provide safeguards against unintended harm.
11. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928) ; United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
12. The following detailed discussion of the packer's decree is taken largely
from Donovan and McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal
Antitrust Laws, 46 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1933).
13. The decree is discussed in detail in Donovan and McAllister, supra
note 12. The action of the attorney general was preceded by an extensive investigation of the meat packing industry by the Federal Trade Commission, in
response to a request of President Wilson in 1917. The resulting decree enjoined
the defendants from: (1) holding any interest in public stockyard companies,
stockyard terminal railroads or market newspapers; (2) engaging in, or holding
any interest in, manufacturing, selling or transporting 114 different food products; (3) permitting others to use their facilities for handling these articles;
(4) selling meat at retail; (5) holding any interest in any public cold storage
plant; (6) selling fresh milk or cream. The decree therefore divested the
defendants of certain facilities owned by them, and prevented their expansion into
other lines of business.
14. These are typical boilerplate provisions found in all consent decrees.
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controversy that existed. From this they contended that at the time
of entry of the decree there was no case or controversy before the
court within the meaning of Section 2 of Article III of the United
States Constitution. Justice Brandeis, who wrote the 1928 decision,
said that, on a motion to vacate, the determination by the trial court
that a case or controversy existed is not open to attack. He went
on to emasculate the argument by saying that a suit for an injunction
deals with threatened future violations; and an injunction may issue
to prevent future wrong although no right has yet been violated.
The packers then argued that ownership of the prohibited
facilities and businesses was lawful, and could not be enjoined unless
connected with a general conspiracy by a finding of fact. Brandeis
replied: "The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
parties and even gross error in the decree would not render it void."'1
The packers next argued that the decree was not limited to
interstate commerce, and covered acts susceptible of being carried
on in intrastate commerce. Brandeis replied, in a now famous statement: "The argument fails to distinguish an error in decision from
the want of power to decide. .

.

. The power to enjoin includes the

power to enjoin too much."' 16 The Court listed the following as the
questions reviewable on appeal: clerical errors in the decree, lack of
actual consent to the decree, fraud in its procurement, and lack of
federal jurisdiction because of the citizenship of the parties. 17 The
actions taken by the trial court (for example, enjoining "too much")
are waived by consenting to the decree, and only the questions
enumerated above, going to the jurisdiction or power of the court to
act, may be reviewed on appeal.
As a practical matter, this leaves the disappointed defendant
with only one alternative: attempt to modify the decree.' 8 This is
what the packers next attempted to do. Their proposed modifications were so extensive as to, in effect, dissipate the original decree.
The main contention of the packers was that their entry into the
retail meat and grocery business would stimulate rather than impede
competition, because of the recent growth of large chain stores. The
trial court and the dissenters of the Supreme Court agreed with them
and favored modification. However, the majority of the Court,
speaking through Justice Cardozo, treated the issue from a legal
rather than on economic viewpoint, and stated the limits of proper
inquiry into a consent decree as follows:
15. 276 U.S. at 330.
16. Id.at 330-31.
17.

As listed by Mr. Justice Brandeis on p. 324 of 276 U.S.

18. Power to later
the decree. Even if it
principles inherent in
Decrees: A Proposal to

modify the decree is almost always expressly reserved in
is not expressly reserved, it is still there by force of the
equity jurisdiction. Kramer, Modification of Consent
the Antitrust Division, 56 Micu. L. Rrv. 1051 (1958).
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The inquiry for us is whether the changes (since the decree)
are so important that dangers, once substantial, have become
attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be
better off if the injunction is relaxed but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in
saying that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing less
than a clear showing of grevious wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was
decreed • . . with the consent of all concerned.19 (Emphasis
added.)
This well known test evolved by the Court is stringent, but just.
It provides for unforeseen occurrences and yet holds the parties to
their agreement. The two packers' cases gave legal strength to the
consent decree, which laid the groundwork for useful implementation
of this enforcement device.
b.

The binding effect of the consent decree u-pon the
Government.
The packers' cases dealt with the binding effect of a consent
decree upon a private party. However, the Government has been
treated in much the same manner. Their application for modification failed in the International Harvester case,2 0 and the Ford
case, 21 which seem to be the leading authorities in this area. The
22
one exception to the strict modification rule is the Chrysler case,
where the Government was allowed to obtain modification of a
contingency provision in a consent decree obtained against Ford
Company and Chrysler Company. This provision provided that
certain sections of the consent decree were to lapse if the Government
failed to obtain similar relief against General Motors (who had
abstained from consenting to the decree) within a certain time. The
time limit passed and the Government, although prosecuting diligently, had failed to end the litigation with General Motors. The
Supreme Court permitted a two year extension of the time, noting
19. 286 U.S. at 119.
20. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
In
this case the original consent decree stated that its object was to restore competitive conditions in the business. The deadline set for this was 18 months.
If competitive conditions were not restored by that time, the decree provided
that the Government may petition for further relief. The Government did petition
at the end of that time, asking that the court break the International Harvester
Company into three independent corporations.
The Supreme Court denied
modification, saying that the defendant had observed the conditions of the decree
(providing, in part, for the sale of certain harvesting machine lines and enjoining
the defendant from having more than one dealer in any town) and to go beyond
those conditions would be going against the decree. So it appears that the consent
decree is also strictly binding on the Government.
21. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948).
The Government
was unable to secure a modification of the Ford automobile finance decree which
would, in effect, extend for ten years the time in which the Government was to
obtain similar relief against General Motors. This case will be discussed in the
text infra.
22. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942).
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that Chrysler failed to show any competitive disadvantage by further
extension of the decree. 23 The inquiry of the Court was whether
the change thwarted the basic purpose of the original consent decree.- 4 However, the Ford case 2, rendered the somewhat ambiguous
rule of the Chrysler case practically meaningless, when the Court
held that the Government had failed to show good cause why a
court of equity should grant relief contrary to the express provisions
of the decree. The Court said the crucial fact was not competitive
disadvantage, but rather the persistence of an inequality (GM remaining untouched) against which protection had been secured in
the original decree. The "basic purpose" test of the Chrysler case
was not reiterated nor relied upon, with the result that the Chrysler
case has not been an important factor in subsequent litigation. 26
It is therefore patent that unilateral modification is extremely
difficult to obtain. The courts are reluctant to overturn a decree
rendered by a court in accordance with the consent of the parties.
The other relief remaining for the Government-a new and separate
proceeding-will be discussed in Section III-B infra.
2. Legal effectiveness of the consent decree through judicial
enforcement.
The Government, if it finds the decree satisfactory, may assure
compliance of the defendant by using the judicial process of contempt
proceedings. 2 7 This is easy when the decree contains a specific,
mandatory injunction. However, enforcement through contempt is
extremely difficult when the decree contains general injunctive provisions which merely restate the law. 28 This is because enforcement
would amount to a regular trial and proof of antitrust violations,
just as in an original suit. The only practical result of a broad
23. At the time of the case the war had brought about complete cessation
of all new car manufacturing. A showing of competitive disadvantage was
therefore impossible.
24. This is the "basic purpose" or "of the essence" test. It would be extremely
difficult to apply, as there is no record showing findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Also, a consent decree rarely states its objectives or purposes. This type of
ruling would seem to have the result of inspiring endless litigation attempting
to determine the "basic purpose" of a decree.
25. See note 21 supra. In this case the Government was attempting to extend
even further the time limit set up in the original consent decree of Chrysler
Company and Ford Company.
26. Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?, 68
YALE L.J. 1391 (1959), notes that the Chrysler case has been rarely cited, and
then only for general propositions in conjunction with other early Supreme
Court modification decisions.
27. Enforcement through contempt proceedings is, of course, an inherent
power of a court of equity.
28. This is where a decree merely restates prohibitions clearly established
by judicial interpretation of the antitrust laws; for example, prohibitions against
market allocation or price fixing. See Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of
Anti-Trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34 (1950).
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injunctive provision (for example, prohibiting monopolizing) might
29
be to keep the defendant in a law-abiding state of mind.
It is therefore the specific mandatory provisions (for example,
a divesture order, or an order directing the defendant to sell, lease,
or give away certain patent rights) that make the consent decree an
important enforcement procedure. This type of provision is clear,
specific, and susceptible to ready proof in case of a violation.
3. Legal effectiveness of the consent decree as a judicial
precedent.
The consent decree is not an effective judicial precedent because
of the fact that there is no record containing facts or conclusions.
It is instead determined entirely by the bargaining of the parties. 0
However, it has sometimes led the case law, as in the area of discouraging abuse of state resale price maintenance statutes. 3 1 Also, it assists in
declaring what legally may be done, which is very helpful in so
vague a field as antitrust law.3 2 Although the decree is not a judicial
guarantee that the approved conduct is lawful, as a practical matter
it is doubtful if the Government would ever attack the conduct and
destroy the attractiveness of the consent decree to a defendant.
II.

USE OF THE CONSENT DECREE

Approximately 75 to 78 per cent of all antitrust suits are settled
by the consent procedure.3 3 This topic will discuss why the Government and private corporations find this procedure such an important
one to use.
A. The policy of the Government.
The Government finds settlement by consent useful for the
following reasons: (1) It offers a means to accomplish results the
34
and expense3 5
Government deems desirable without the time
29.

Ibid.

30. Barnes, Settlement by Consent Judgment, 4 ABA ANTITRUST

SECTION

PROCEEDINGS 8 (April, 1954): Timberg, Recent Development in Antitrust Consent
judgments, 10 FED. B.J. 351 (1949).

31. Peterson, supra note 28 at 46.
32. Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees,
53 HARV. L. REv. 386 (1940).
The authors list the cases which declare what
legally may be done on pages 393 and 394 of their article.
33. SUBCOMM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE 7, 8 (Comm.

Print 1959).
34. The average litigated case takes 59.27 months from the time of filing
the complaint to entry of final judgment. The average consent decree takes 32.86

months from the time of either initial negotiation or filing a complaint until it is
entered. Id. at 9. It therefore takes on the average two more years to try a case
than to obtain relief by a consent judgment.
35. "Since savings in time generally spell savings of men and resources,
consent settlements mean lower costs to the Antitrust Division per judgment
entered." Id. at 10. This is undoubtedly a weighty factor, as government litigation expenses have been estimated at $100,000 to $150,000 per case. See Note,
Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 31 INn. L.J. 357 (1956).
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necessary to secure a litigated decree.
(2) Specific measures of
relief can be obtained which might be difficult to get in a litigated
case. 33 (3) There is no uncertainty of result.3 7 (4) The Government is not required to produce and prove a factual basis for its
complaint. (5) The procedure is informal, which assists immensely
in solving the non-legal economic problems. All of these advantages
must make the consent procedure very tempting to the often under
manned and under financed Antitrust Department. However, their
policy in regard to the consent decree seems to be that they will
settle only when it is in the public interest, and not merely to save
38
time and money.
B. Views of the Private Corporations.
Almost all corporate defendants look favorably upon the consent
decree.

The reasons for this approval are as follows. 39

(1) The

time between the filing of the complaint and the termination of
litigation is always uncertain and often of a long duration. The
defendant may be paralyzed during this time so far as future plans
are concerned. (2) The costs of antitrust litigation upon a defendant
are enormous, not only in dollars but also as a drain on important
executives' time. There is also present the imponderable costs of the
adverse publicity continuing throughout a long trial. (3) There is
almost always a good chance that the defendants will lose. Pure
self-interest dictates that a government enforcement agency will only
bring a suit when it believes it can win it. (4) The fear of treble
damage suits is ever present. The defendant realizes that the ultimate
cost of deciding to litigate may be many times the cost of the original
government suit.
All of the above factors tend to make settlement by consent
decree very attractive to a corporate defendant. By consenting, he
40
saves time, expense, uncertainty and unfavorable publicity.
C. Relative bargaining power of the parties.
The question as to which party has the better bargaining position
in the negotiation for a consent decree is an important one because
36. This topic will be discussed in section III-A infra.
37. In addition to the uncertainties during the trial, often the Government
will win a case in the trial court and be disappointed on appeal. See HAMILTON
& TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-97 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940), for some
examples.
38. Arr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 360-61 (1955).
39. This list of reasons was taken from Horsky, Settlement, in AN ANTITRUST
HANDBOOK 507 (1958).
Horsky is a well-known defense lawyer.
40. Horsky, supra note 39, believes that these reasons make the impetus
to negotiate so strong that only unusual circumstances render consent impossible.
These circumstances are as follows: if the Government is definitely contemplating
criminal proceedings; if it is seeking adjudication of an important issue of law; or
if the defendant is facing a challenge to a legal position he regards as vital, or
a challenge to his very existence.
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of the binding effect of the decree. The above
why each party desires a consent decree over
to indicate that the corporate defendant is
precarious position and would therefore have
Some authors agree with this. 4 1

list of reasons, showing
litigation, would seem
in a somewhat more
less bargaining power.

Others argue that the Government

is also forced to make concessions, as they are often unaware of the
intricacies of the business, and must get their evidence from hostile
witnesses. 42 The only definite answer to this is that the bargaining
power of the parties is necessarily a case by case situation. Public
opinion, the current resources of the parties, and the importance
to the parties of the issues raised will necessarily vary with each
case. In the overall picture, it would seem that the government is
in a better bargaining position, as its mode of existence, unlike
that of a corporate defendant, does not depend upon the result of a
litigated decree.
II1.

PROBLEMS

CONCERNING

THE

CONSENT

DECREE

A.

Daes it sanction enforcement procedures which go beyond
the bounds of judicial approval? If so, is this necessarily
harmful?
The Government has frequently been accused of exacting
43
remedial provisions which go beyond the bounds of existing law.
The provision which inspires the most comment, and which shall be
the center of discussion in this topic, is that providing for compulsory
licensing of patents royalty free. 44 Most commentators, who declare
that compulsory licensing without royalty is going too far, rely upon
the case of Hartford Empire Co. v. United States,45 which involved
appeal of a litigated case containing this type of provision. The
Supreme Court, declaring that a patent is property, held that the
provision was confiscatory and not justified by the circumstances of
41.
REv. 285
be more
42.

Segal and Mullinix, Administration and Enforcement, 104 U. PA. L.
(1955) , are quite emphatic about this, and suggest that the Government
lenient and yielding in their negotiations.
Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees,
53 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1940); HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRuST IN ACTION 88-97
(TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940).
43. Comment, Regulation of Business-Sherman Act-Administration and
Enforcement-A Re-analysis of Consent Decrees, 55 MIcH. L. REV. 92 (1956);
Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 34 (1950).
44. Some of the less commented upon provisions, which are also accused
of going beyond the bounds of judicial approval, are where the defendant was
ordered to increase its customers by a specified percentage, or where individual
defendants were forbidden to vote shares of corporate defendants. Both of these
provisions are found in United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., TRADE
REc. REP. (1948-49 Trade Cas.)
62523 (N.D. Ohio 1948), and are found by
Peterson, Consent Decees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 34, 49 (1949), to be beyond existing law.
45. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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the case. 46 The subsequent case of United States v. National Lead
Co. 47 affirmed a district court decision disallowing a royalty free
patent provision, but said that they were not deciding the constitutionality of such a provision.
The objectors to this provision therefore rest their case on the
fact that it has not been approved by the Supreme Court. But is the
effect of including this provision in a decree necessarily harmful?
This is a provision which two parties at arms length have agreed upon
and which has, at least, not been declared illegal by the Supreme
Court. The basis for the arguments against allowing whatever provisions the parties may agree upon must be that the Government
has such a superior bargaining position that it is asking for more
than it should. However, there are two flaws in this type of reasoning:
(1) The Government is not actually in the strong bargaining
position which would be necessary in order to force unjust concessions. This is because they too are working on a budget, have
limited manpower, and face the possibility of losing the case in court
if they push too far. However, even if the defendant is in as bad a
bargaining position as the opponents of these provisions would seem
to indicate, one might ask how he got there. To be placed in a
position where one is susceptible to abuse, he must have been clearly
violating the law. There have been sixty-some years of interpretation
of the admittedly vague antitrust laws, so surely he had some idea
of what he was doing. Also, if the defendant feels he is being abused,
he always has the option of litigating the issues instead of consenting
to the decree.
(2) Even assuming that the Government does have this superior
bargaining position, what would be gained from abusing it? The
objective of the Government is merely to stop illegal activities or
prevent legal activities from becoming illegal. 48 To misuse the
consent procedure by making confiscatory and unreasonable demands
would be senseless. It would deprive the Government of one of their
most effective enforcement procedures, as defendants would soon be
prone to litigate rather than consent.
Horsky, a defense counsel, has said that abstract criticism of
the provisions in a consent decree cannot be meaningful, as the
decrees are molded by underlying facts. 49

He seems to feel that in

46. This qualification added by the Court-that the provision was not justified by the circumstances of the case-rebutts the argument that the Court
emphatically declared this type of provision illegal.

47. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
48. Isenbergh and Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees,
53 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1940).
49. EIorsky, supra note 39. He says, at page 507: "If a company has five
worthless patents, and can dedicate them in order to achieve an advantage elsewhere
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actual practice nothing is arbitrarily forced upon the private corporations.
It is conceded that some provisions in consent decrees do go
beyond the bounds of current judicial approval. However, in view
of the uniqueness of the situation and the lack of motive to abuse,
it is submitted that there is no cause to complain of any unwilling
loss of rights.
B.

Are the requirements for modification or termination too
stringent?
The subject of modification and termination of a consent decree
has been discussed in Section I-B (1) supra. It was there determined
that unilateral modification is extremely difficult to obtain, requiring, in essence, a substantial and unforeseen change in conditions
since the date of the original decree. 5 0 Is this requirement too
restricting? It would seem not, as the real need for modification, a
change of conditions, is provided for. Except for that circumstance,
it is hard to see why the parties should not be held to the decree
they agreed upon. This type of standard wisely discourages recurring litigation by defendants who wish to avoid the provisions
of their decree. The other alternative available, termination of the
consent decree, is impossible to get once the time for appeal has
passed, and is allowed only upon basic jurisdictional mistakes. 5 1
This dispenses with the remedies available to the defendant.
The Government has one other alternative to pursue if the decree is
ineffective and modification impossible to achieve. They may
initiate a new and separate proceeding, alleging a different cause of
action. The primary question involved here is the extent to which
a consent decree is res judicata to a new action.52 The answer
would seem to be, legally, that the Government would have no
difficulty in pursuing a new cause of action. This is because of the
amorphous nature of an antitrust cause of action,53 the variety of
proceedings open to the Government, and the fact that business
in the decree, there is little point in a charge that dedication of patents is an
unfortunate yielding to a confiscatory demand."
50. The other ground upon which one could obtain modification is that the
change sought is relatively insubstantial and within the purpose of the original
decree. However, the difficulties in application of this rule were mentioned in

section I-B (1) (b) supra.
51. See section I-B(l) (a) supra.

52. For an excellent article on the res judicata effects of the earlier consent
decree, see Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective An Umbrella?, 68
YALE L.J. 1391 (1959).
53. This makes it possible for the Government to place a different label
upon a subsequent suit, and call it a different cause of action. The Government,
of course, cannot sue on the same cause of action, as the prior decree acts as an
absolute bar to a subsequent action. Id. at 1398.
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relations do not remain static."
However, although the Government
probably will not be prevented from instituting a new proceeding,
it may have some difficulty admitting proof which extends back into
the period covered by the earlier decree.!"" This is because of the
lack of a record showing what facts the decree was decided upon,
and the fact that a consent decree is often framed in general terms,
which leads to the conclusion that all prior acts were covered by the
decree. As a practical matter, the defendant may be assured of at
least a few years of comparative safety under the decree, as the
Government would hesitate to immediately attack a decree and
thereby destroy its attractiveness to corporate defendants.
C.

Is enforcement through this type of proceeding effective
and desirable?
1. Some recent criticisms of the consent decree.

The most recent criticism of the consent procedure comes from
the report of a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary. •
This report was the result of hearings held in 1957 and
1958. ,
The committee decided to investigate after receiving numerous complaints about the consent procedure. "8 The following are
the principal criticisms of the majority of the committee, and were
largely patterned upon the complaints received:
(1) Consent decrees have eliminated the judiciary from enforcement of the antitrust laws. The Antitrust Division has ceased to be
a prosecutor and has, instead, became enmeshed in industrial regulation, for which it is inadequately equipped.
(2) Competitors of the defendants have been denied the treble
damage benefits which result from the Government winning a litigated suit; and they are often unable to undertake this type of protracted litigation by themselves.
(3) The consent procedure is too secret.

Competitors may be

54. This fluidity of business dealings makes it possible for the Government
to find some violation subsequent to the original decree, which it probably already
has or it would not be complaining of the ineffectiveness of the consent decree.

55. Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal to the Antitrust
Division, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1958). This limitation may make it exceedingly
difficult to prove a violation, as often violations must be proved by showing
conduct over a number of years.
56. SUBCOMM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Comm. Print

1959).
57. Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee (Sitbcommittee No. 5) of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, pt. 1 (1957),
and 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9, pt. 2 (1958) .
58. The stated objective of the committee was "... to examine into the
procedures and actions that surround negotiation and entry of consent settlements

and their effectiveness in the realization of antitrust policies so as to afford a
basis for administrative and legislative recommendations." REPORT, supra note
56, at xiv.

COMMENTS
indirectly damaged by the decree, yet there is no opportunity for
them to present their views prior to its entry. Also, the defendants
can escape unfavorable publicity, which is a major deterring factor
for most defendants.
(4) Consent decrees arrest the growth of judicial precedent
because they cut down the number of litigated decrees. This, therefore, deprives business and the bar of the opportunity to ascertain
if the practices attacked in the complaint are actually illegal.
(5) Once a decree has been entered, the Department of Justice
turns to other business, and fails to enforce it.
The committee centered their investigation and based their
conclusions upon two consent decrees: the A.T. & T. decree ,9 and
the oil pipelines decree. 0 This in itself would seem to be much
too narrow a basis for such a study, 61 albeit the committee's investigation of these two decrees was painstakingly thorough. 62 Nevertheless, the committee does seem to voice the basic criticisms of the
consent procedure which have been set forth by other authors. 63
2. Is there available within the ambit of present antitrust law
any procedure that might more effectively accomplish the
desired result?
This discussion will center upon some relatively minor suggestions for improvement of the consent procedure which may be
innovated without any major change in the antitrust laws.
Despite an apparently basic defect in the scope of their investigation, some of the suggestions made by the aforementioned committee
seem very sound. They note the extreme shortage of manpower
59.

United States v. Western Elec. Co. and Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., TRADE
(1956 Trade Cas.)
68246 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1956).
60. United States v. Atlantic Ref. Co., Civil Action No. 14060, D.D.C., Dec.
23, 1941. For a detailed discussion of the provisions and effect of this decree, see
1957 Hearings, supra note 57, at 27.
61. Both of the decrees were susceptible to criticism. The A.T. & T. decree
failed to achieve the objective of the Government as it was stated in their initial
complaint (divestiture of A.T. & T. and Western Electric) , and the oil pipelines
decree was evidently ignored by the defendants once it was final. Consequently,
a study of just these decrees would tend to induce severe criticism (which it did)
and lead to a one-sided view of the problem. One may wonder what other suggestions might have appeared had a comprehensive study been made.
62. The committee held twenty-one days of hearings at which thirty-three
principal witnesses testified, with the printed hearings totaling 4,492 pages in five
volumes. The report of the committee consists of 357 pages which, according to
the minority, is "much chaff with very little wheat." REPORT, supra note 56,
at 327.
63. Rogers, Is it Trust Busting or Window Dressing? The Reporter, Nov.
1, 1956, p. 21. Mr. Rogers believes that the Government must conduct prosecution
in the courts or they are undermining the basic spirit of the antitrust laws. He
says the Republicans are merely tabulating, through consent decrees, an impressive
list of prosecutions they claim that they have concluded, but they are not protecting the public interest by this process of "gentlemanly treatymaking." HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-97 (TNEC Monograph No. 16. 1940), are
particularly critical of the lack of enforcement of consent decrees.
REG. REP.
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available within the Antitrust Division when enforcement is necessary, 64 and suggest that the Attorney General take advantage of his
his power to require the Federal Trade Commission to investigate
possible infractions. 65 This would seem to alleviate the ever-present
problem of budget limitations. They also suggest that the consent
procedure provide for public notice of the terms of the decree and
establish a waiting period after agreement on the terms and prior to
court approval. This would allow the private parties who may be
affected by the decree an opportunity to intervene and present
objections to the court. Both of these suggestions seem very practical,
and do not appear to have any adverse effect upon the established
process of settlement.
Another suggestion of the committee which seems useful is to
require the Government, upon presenting the decree to the court,
to accompany it with an opinion setting forth the facts involved,
defendant's position, meaning of the terms, and the reasons why the
Government accepted it. This change of procedure would enhance
the role of the trial judge in accepting or rejecting the decree, as he
would have some knowledge of the workings behind it. This may
eliminate the present routine approval of consent decrees.
Another suggestion which has been made is to provide in the
decree for arbitration of provisions and questions of modification
upon which the parties may later disagree. 66 If arbitration would
result in conflict as a process in itself, the parties could, as an alternative, provide that they will submit the controlling facts to a court
for a decision of the law. This type of procedure would help resolve
the unsettled disputes and questions which arise in the process of
carrying out a consent decree.
64. The Judgments and Judgment Enforcement Section of the Antitrust
Division is responsible for the negotiation of consent judgments. This section also
supervises the investigations made to enforce compliance with the provisions of
both the consent judgments and the litigated judgments. There are only twenty
attorneys in this section, and they are responsible for the supervision and enforcement of a total of 554 civil antitrust judgments which, as of December 17, 1958,
included 454 consent decrees. REPORT, supra note 56, at 7.
65. fhe Attorney General has the power to require the FTC to investigate
violations of any final antitrust decrees and to conduct initial investigations and
make recommendations prior to bringing an antitrust suit. These powers are
given the Attorney General under Sections 6(c) and 6(e) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
However, it appears
that the Attorney General has only once invoked the aid of the FTC when
investigating violations of final decrees. This is highly criticized by the majority
of the committee, who point out that the FTC is a repository of vast information
about business practices in numerous industries, and has general investigatory
powers, including subpoena authority, that are not available to the Antitrust
Division.

REPORT, supra note 56, at 18.

66. Donovan and McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of the
Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 46 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1933).
The authors also suggest
that the consent decree should more frequently spell out what can as well as what
cannot be done, and thereby let the businessman know where he stands. However, this may produce some problems in itself because of the fluid nature of
business dealings. What can be done today often cannot be done tomorrow.

COMMENTS

One author argues that an important improvement in consent
decree procedure would be to set a time limit (for example, twenty
years) on the decrees. 67 At that time the Government, if it wishes to
keep the decree in force, must petition the court and explain why.
A hearing would then be given the parties to see if continuation of
the decree is necessary. The reasoning behind this is that a consent
judgment which has already been in effect for twenty years has
probably been ineffective if its injunctions are still necessary. This
procedure would allow a reassessment of the market conditions at that
time to see if the provisions of the decree are still important, and at
the same time would eliminate from the record any decrees which are
08
no longer necessary to the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
All of these suggestions seem worthy of debate and possible
implementation into the consent procedure. In particular the provisions calling for use of the FTC investigatory powers, public notice
and a time period prior to approval, and setting a time limit upon
the decrees would seem to be very helpful in rectifying certain defects
in the consent procedure. They have the further appealing factor of
not seriously upsetting the present methods of settlement.
CONCLUSION

In general, it would appear that the consent decree is at present
a highly flexible and useful enforcement device for the Government.
The decree avoids one of the greatest difficulties the Government
has encountered in enforcing the antitrust laws-that of attempting to
resolve economic questions through the use of court procedure.
Although it has its faults, most of them can be remedied through
implementation of the suggestions enumerated above. Perhaps the
greatest shortcoming of the consent decree is its complete dependence
upon an aggressive and intelligent Antitrust Division, something
which, regretfully, cannot always be guaranteed. However, until a
complete revision of the antitrust laws has come about, this timesaving and effective device is certain to continue to play an important part in antitrust enforcement.
J. DENNIS HYNES*
67. Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal to the Antitrust
Division, 56 MicH. L. REV. 1051 (1958).
68. Kramer, supra note 67, also suggests that the Government should be
allowed to present evidence of violations occurring prior to the original decree
if the decree is terminated after twenty years. This could be done by simply
including a provision in the first decree allowing the court to dismiss the original
complaint without prejudice.
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